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1. The European Digital Single Market Strategy and Copyright1
The Strategy for Europe’s Digital Single Market2 sets out three pillars for the 
creation of  an effective Digital Single Market: (a) improving consumer and business 
access to online goods and services across Europe; (b) creating the right conditions for 
digital networks and services to flourish; and (c) maximizing the growth potential of  
Europe’s digital economy by investing in infrastructure and research to boost business 
innovation. 
Within the first pillar described above is the Directive (EU) 2019/790 of  the 
European Parliament and of  the Council of  17 April 2019 on copyright and related 
rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/
EC (hereinafter, Copyright in the DSM Directive).3
One of  the most controversial aspects of  the CDSM Directive was the new 
regulation of  liability of  some kinds of  digital platforms – specifically, online content 
sharing service providers – for the infringement of  copyright, an issue that will be 
addressed within this paper. The abovementioned amendment to the general parameters 
of  liability of  intermediary platforms aims to respond to the growing concern for 
fairness in the distribution along the value chain of  the value generated by some of  the 
new forms of  online content distribution.4
As a background to the issue, the Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of  the Regions “Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market 
Opportunities and Challenges for Europe” expressed the wish to maintain the 
exemption from liability of  information service providers, but recalled the need to 
take into account the protection of  intellectual property rights. Therefore, different 
initiatives have been taken to encourage voluntary measures to filter and block content 
(algorithmic tools),5 as well as legislative improvements in the sectoral regulation of  
audiovisual media services and copyright.6
Therefore, the writing of  the Copyright in the DSM Proposal for a Directive,7 in 
particular Article 13 (now Article 17 Copyright in the DSM Directive), started with a 
1 This paper is an updated version of  the invited speaker’s presentation at the Final Meeting of  the 
“INTEROP - EU Digital Single Market as a political calling: interoperability as the way forward” 
Project, in Braga, 2-3 May 2019.
2 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and social Committee and the Committee of  the Regions “A Digital Single Market 
Strategy for Europe”, COM(2015) 192 final, 6.5.2015, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52015DC0192
3 OJEU 17.5.2019.
4 Underlined by the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of  the Regions “Promoting a 
fair, efficient and competitive European copyright-based economy in the digital single market”, COM 
(2016) 592 final, 14.9.2016, https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2016/EN/1-2016-592-
EN-F1-1.PDF.
5 Andrea Katalin Tóth, “Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement and AI: issues and potential solutions, 
through the lens of  text and data mining”, Masaryk University Journal of  Law and Technology 13:2 (2019): 
365, points out that it is a matter of  controlling digital uses through digital technologies.
6 Julián López Richart, “Responsables, ma non troppo: las reglas de exención de responsabilidad de 
las plataformas para el intercambio de contenidos en línea en la directiva sobre derechos de autor en 
el mercado único digital”, in Propiedad Intelectual y Mercado Único Digital Europeo, ed. Concepción Saiz 
García et al (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2019), 315.
7 Proposal for a Directive of  the European Parliament and of  the Council on Copyright in the Digital 
Single Market COM/2016/0593 final - 2016/0280 (COD), 14.9.2016, COM(2016) 593 final.
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clear intention to improve the position of  copyright holders to negotiate and obtain 
fair remuneration for the exploitation of  their content by online service providers that 
store and make publicly accessible large amounts of  works uploaded by users of  such 
platforms.
2. The value gap: the rise of  the prosumers
The introduction of  Article 13 in the Proposal (now Article 17 Copyright in 
the DSM Directive) caused a real stir among digital platforms and their users, – also 
consumers and academia – who launched a wide-ranging campaign against alleged 
censorship of  content exchange and the rising costs of  internet access, claiming that 
the European Commission had succumbed to the audiovisual and music industry lobby 
with its discourse on the value gap, to the detriment of  citizens’ interest in safeguarding 
their fundamental rights, especially freedom of  expression.8 Only a few EU rules have 
been the subject of  such heated social debate in recent years as Article 13, which was 
finally drafted (now Article 17) in a more conciliatory version of  the interests at stake.
Criticism of  this rule has focused both on the costs and difficulty of  implementing 
monitoring controls as well as on the side effects that filtering could have on the rights 
of  freedom of  expression and on the possibility of  actually using the exceptions and 
limits to copyright.9
In any case, what was always present in the legislative process and is contained 
in Article 17 Copyright in the DSM Directive is the need for fairer remuneration for 
rights holders that minimizes the so-called value gap.
It is a known fact that the consumption of  content that is uploaded and shared 
on different online service platforms is growing exponentially. A significant part of  this 
increase is also justified by the emergence on the market of  a new consumer profile: 
the prosumer,10 an active consumer who does not merely enjoy content, but also 
generates his or her own content - user-generated content (hereinafter, “UGC”)11 – 
and makes it publicly available, often transforming works and performances protected 
by copyright.12
8 Global digital players, internet activists, European technology start-ups and the European 
Consumers Organisations opposed the overhaul. See details in the study “Culture and creative 
sectors in the European Union – Key future developments, challenges and opportunities” requested 
by the CULT committee (European Parliament)”, September 2019, https://www.europarl.europa.
eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2019/629203/IPOL_STU(2019)629203_EN.pdf. In fact “Criticism 
of  proposed Article 13 focused on three main types of  harms: harms to individuals’ expressive 
freedom, harms to online businesses, and harms to innovation and competition at the internet’s 
application layer” (Annemarie Bridy, “The Price of  closing the value gap: how the music industry 
hacked EU Copyright Reform”, Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. (2019):123.
9 Summarizes the discussions Belén Aige Mut, “El polémico ‘fin de internet’ a raíz del artículo 13 de 
la propuesta de Directiva sobre copyright: ¿serán eficientes las garantías propuestas en el mismo?”, in 
Justicia: garantías versus eficiencia”, ed. Rafael Bellido (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2019), 507-512.
10 See Concepción Sáiz García, “Creatividad 3.0”, Revista Derecho y Nuevas Tecnologías 42 (2016): 121
11 CGU is a meta-legal concept that includes very diverse behaviours. This is a fairly broad category 
that can range from artistic creations made with 3D animation technology by non-professionals to 
journalistic content generated by citizens who have your smartphone takes pictures of  an event that 
might be of  interest informative. Thus, CGU are all those contents that a consumer of  technologies 
is able to create in an original way by adapting, modifying or incorporating third party works, but also 
non-creative interactions such as giving their unprocessed opinions, participating in games, draws, 
interviews, etc., all at the click of  a button. See Isabel Espín Alba, “Transmedia, fanfiction, contratos 
y derechos de autor”, Actas de Derecho Industrial y Derechos de autor 39 (2019): 196. 
12  The Green Paper on “Copyright in the Knowledge Economy” [COM(2008) 466 final, 16.7.2008] 
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The spread of  information and communication technologies and the 
popularization of  tools and platforms for the production and dissemination of  
audiovisual contents have favoured a real explosion of  creations made by the users. 
This type of  production is usually carried out with few means, driven by individuals 
and non-professional groups that usually use the Internet as a base camp. They point to 
new forms of  participation in which a new media agent emerges, the consumer, citizen 
or user himself. They are productions that make possible the incorporation of  the 
public in the production process until the redefinition of  their own model of  cultural 
production and consumption
The issue lies in the volume and quantitative impact of  the creations generated by 
the consumers of  artistic and literary works. But it is also a qualitative question, since 
now the action of  the prosumer is foreseen and encouraged by the producers of  digital 
contents themselves. For example, the creators of  the transmedia strategy encourage 
the active participation of  the consumer to generate new content from the transmedia 
product created for dissemination in different formats, channels and platforms, some 
of  them created for the purpose of  multiplying the active participation of  users. In any 
case, the possibility for audiences to share through social platforms or to generate their 
own content is raising new ethical and legal issues.
Of  all the issues that relate to UGC within intellectual property rights, the 
question of  the lack of  authorization for the transformation of  works available on 
such platforms stands out. 
When users create original works without the authorization of  the holders of  the 
intellectual property rights in the pre-existing works, they are infringing their rights, in 
particular the right of  transformation.13
Due to the high consumption rates of  digital content, many of  which is protected 
by copyright, it should be accompanied by an exponential increase in the profits of  the 
owners of  copyrighted and related works and services. However, this is not the case 
for sectors as important to European GDP as the audiovisual and music industries14. 
Copyright holders have long claimed a fairer share of  the increase in revenue from the 
supply and sale of  digital products.
The key word in this intense debate is the value gap, a concept imported from 
economic studies to refer, in this case, to the enormous difference between the profits 
already recognised that “ Consumers are not only users but are increasingly becoming creators of  
content”. It pointed that: “ Web 2.0 applications such as blogs, podcasts, wiki, or video sharing, enable 
users easily to create and share text, videos or pictures, and to play a more active and collaborative role 
in content creation and knowledge dissemination”.
13 Therefore, there is a growing debate on the need for a genuine status of  derivative works and their 
licensing or at least a reform of  the limitations system to accommodate the reality of  transformative 
uses by users. Espín Alba, “Transmedia”, 195. On the issue of  the creation of  a specific limit for 
CGUs, combined with equitable remuneration, see Martin Senftleben, “User generated content: 
towards a new use privilege in EU copyright law”, in Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and Digital 
Technologies, ed. Tanya Aplin (Elgar Publishing, 2020), 136-162.
14 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of  the Regions “Towards a modern, more 
European copyright framework”, COM(2015) 626 final (OJUE 9.12.2015) and the Opinion of  
the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Proposal for a Directive of  the European 
Parliament and of  the Council on copyright in the Digital Single Market’, [(COM(2016) 593 final — 
2016/0280 (COD)]. OJEU 21.4.2017. From the perspective of  the rightholders, see CISAC, Global 
Collections Report 2019 (For 2018 Data), p. 26-27, accessed May 29, 2020, https://www.cisac.org/
CISAC-University/Library/Global-Collections-Reports/Global-Collections-Report-2019.
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of  intermediaries in copyright-protected content services and the values received by 
the rightholders. As a result, the so-called “value gap” has developed, in which the 
services of  the platform retain the value of  the cultural and creative works, which is 
detracted from the creators; and the gap gets deeper if  we compare comparatively 
new business models, such as paid streaming platforms with older business models. 
The value gap has created an inefficient and iniquitous market and threatens 
the long-term strength of  the Union’s cultural and creative sector and the success of  
the digital single market. Therefore, liability exemptions should only apply to truly 
neutral and passive online service providers and not to services playing an active 
role in the distribution, promotion and monetisation of  content at the expense of  
creators. 
In that sense, a 2014 IFPI (International Federation of  the Phonographic 
Industry) report15 describes two different types of  streaming strategies.16 On 
the one hand, there are subscription platforms such as Spotify or Deezer, which 
include in their model the willingness to negotiate and pay royalties for the use of  
the works, and on the other hand, there are service providers operating under the 
model of  embedded advertising, which are reluctant to pay royalties for the use 
of  the copyrighted works and benefits, on the grounds that they are not the ones 
who upload the content to the network but their users. They claim that they are 
only hosting intermediaries, which allows them to be protected in the case of  safe 
harbours, i.e. to be considered as mere hosts, without final responsibility for the use 
of  the protected content uploaded by the users.  
The sector that can provide us with the most data is the music industry. 
The common denominator of  these studies is the finding that while Youtube is 
paying hundreds of  dollars for every million streams, streaming services are paying 
thousands of  euros. In fact, after a deep crisis of  the analogical model, derived from 
the content piracy through digital technologies, an important bet was made for 
the public communication of  contents through platforms such as Spotify, Deezer, 
Pandora, Apple Music, Tidal,  Napster, Google Play Music, which offer subscription 
services, both free and premium. This has meant an upturn in the industry; however, 
despite improved revenue figures, there is still a feeling that they are not being fairly 
remunerated for the use of  their works. Platforms such as YouTube are seen as 
intermediaries that use artistic content to attract users, but are unwilling to recognize 
the fair value of  content protected by intellectual property rights.
As a result, the EU rule under consideration (Article 17 Copyright in the DSM 
Directive) is in fact a mechanism designed to meet the challenge of  transferring 
value from online intermediaries to creators in today’s digital environment. It seeks 
to address the issue that, despite the fact that more content is being consumed than 
ever before, there is no corresponding increase in revenue for the creative sectors 
and that some intermediaries do not satisfy fair licenses commensurate with the 
value of  their use of  the content.
15 Global Music Report”, IFPI, accessed March 18, 2020, https://www.ifpi.org/downloads/GMR2016.
pdf.
16 And always on the rise. A 2019 study, also by IFPI, states that digital revenues now account for more 
than half  (58.9%) of  the global recorded music market. Total streaming revenues increased by 34.0%. 
By the end of  2018, there were 255 million users of  paid subscription accounts globally. “IFPI”, 
accessed March 18, 2020, https://www.ifpi.org/recording-industry-in-numbers.php.
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In order not to lose perspective on the issue, it is worth remembering that the 
history of  copyright is the history of  the evolution of  technological media, so that 
this type of  legal crossroads requiring creativity and the legislator’s desire to balance 
interests is not new.
In particular, the value gap was behind the creation and construction of  different 
legislative techniques in the field of  intellectual property. A significant number of  
anecdotes illustrate this eternal struggle between fair remuneration for the creators of  
protected content and the intermediaries, users and other economic agents involved in 
the circulation of  products containing protected works or services. There is a mismatch 
between the exponential increase in the consumption of  music and the return of  
profits for rightholders.
One of  the oldest, referring to the very construction of  what we understand 
today as “right of  public communication” leads us to a judicial dispute between the creators 
of  intellectual works and the intermediaries of  their communication to the public. In 
1847, the composers Parizot and Henrion, after attending the performance of  one 
of  their works at the Les Ambassadeurs, a Café-Concert in Paris, refused to pay for 
the seats and the drinks, claiming that the owner was also selling music and songs 
to his customers without paying the authors. The matter was taken to the French 
courts which ended up recognizing a right of  public communication in each musical 
performance and the possibility of  collective management by the authors themselves, 
with the creation of  one of  the most important management societies: the Société des 
Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs de Musique (SACEM). 17
3. The liability of  platforms in the E-Commerce Directive (EC 
Directive)18
In the previous framework of  the reform represented by the Copyright in the 
DSM Directive it was understood that these online content sharing service providers, 
with regard to the content uploaded by users, were only hosters.19 Through this 
moderate level of  requirement, the aim was to recognize the value of  intermediary 
platforms in the information society and to encourage the growth of  the supply of  
service providers.20
The Communication “Online platforms and the digital single market. Challenges 
and opportunities for Europe” highlights the importance of  different forms of  
17 Delia Lipszyc, Derecho de Autor y Derechos Conexos (Buenos Aires: UNESCO, 1993), 412.
18 Directive 2000/31/EC of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  8 June 2000 on certain 
legal aspects of  information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market 
(‘Directive on electronic commerce’), OJ L 178 , 17.7.2000.
19 Pedro De Miguel Asensio, “Mercado Único Digital y Propiedad Intelectual: Las Directivas 2019/789 
y 2019/790”, La Ley Unión Europea (2019): 1-16.
20 In this regard, the so-called safe harbour for the EC Directive means that the liability of  information 
society service providers is removed or mitigated when their contribution to the infringement is 
limited to transmission, linking, hosting and dissemination of  information generated by third parties. 
In fact, the concept and scope of  safe harbours suggests a pro-platform interpretation. See Esther 
Arroyo Amayuelas, “La responsabilidad de los intermediarios en internet ¿Puertos seguros a prueba 
de futuro?”, Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional 12 (2020): 808-837 and Julián López Richart, “Un 
nuevo régimen de responsabilidad para las plataformas de almacenamiento de contenidos generados 
por usuarios en el Mercado Único Digital”, Pe.i, revista de propiedad intelectual 60 (2018): 67-126. Also 
Judgments Google France vs. Louis Vuitton (23.3.2010, C-236/08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:159); L`Óreal vs 
eBay (C-324/09, 12.7.2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:474); Scarlet Extended vs SABAM (C-70/10, 24.11.2011, 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:771); and Promusicae vs Telefónica (C275/06, 20.1.2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:54).
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digital platforms: online advertising platforms, online markets, search engines, social 
networks and creative media, application distribution platforms, communication 
services, payment systems and platforms dedicated to the collaborative economy; in 
creating “digital value”, especially by attracting significant levels of  value (e.g. through 
data accumulation), facilitating new business projects and creating new strategic 
dependencies. However, under the heading of  ensuring responsible behaviour of  
online platforms, it identified the exemption from liability of  the EC Directive as one 
of  the issues that should be addressed. Thus, in the Communication “Fighting against 
illegal content online. Towards increasing the responsibility of  online platforms” it was 
specified that the lack of  speed in withdrawing content is a factor in the exponential 
increase in potential economic damage which must be accounted for by the measures 
taken.
From the outset, the emergence of  intermediary services on the market raised 
concerns about the extent of  their responsibility for illegal content that could include, 
in the area of  interest in this paper, infringements of  intellectual property rights. Many 
issues were at stake when the European legislator faced the question of  whether 
websites hosting protected works without authorization should be responsible for 
what users upload. These questions concerned not only copyright infringement and 
digital content providers to share, but for any type of  digital platform and for any type 
of  infringement of  rights.
The aim was to encourage technological innovation and the proper functioning 
of  the Internet. In this regard, it was considered that a comprehensive liability regime 
requiring intermediaries to monitor the actions of  the users of  their service would be 
a disincentive to invest in new applications that would improve the functioning of  the 
Network, and would be a burden to their development and success.21
In light of  the above, it was understood that the platforms were merely providers 
of  intermediary services and, as such, did not infringe intellectual property rights since, 
strictly speaking, they did not reproduce or communicate works or related services, but 
merely provided the technical means for the users of  their services to carry out these 
acts of  reproduction and interactive public communication. 
Even in the cases of  those intermediary-aggregators who do not merely host 
content, but facilitate the availability of  the same directly from their online site, they do 
not in principle have any control or editorial responsibility over the content uploaded to 
the platform by the users of  the same, and it is the users who take the decision to store 
and make available the videos on the platform, and who are therefore responsible for 
any possible infringement of  rights of  third parties, especially when the intermediary 
implements effective procedures to receive notifications and to proceed with the 
removal of  illegal content.22
The EC Directive already establishes a system for the withdrawal of  content 
that hinges on two hitherto well-established and interrelated concepts. The first is 
the prohibition of  imposing a general obligation on intermediaries to monitor illegal 
content. Secondly, such intermediaries will be liable only if, having actual knowledge 
of  the illegality of  the content hosted, they have not acted promptly to remove it or 
21 Diego Solana, “Aprobada la Directiva que cambiará internet”, Web Cremades¬Calvo Sotelo, https://
www.cremadescalvosotelo.com/noticias-legales/aprobada-la-directiva-que-cambiara-internet, last 
modified April 16, 2019.
22 Fernando Carbajo Cascón, “Delimitación de la responsabilidad de los servicios de intermediación 
de la sociedad de la información (II)”, Iustitia (2015): 230.
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to prevent access to it. To this end, effective knowledge requires that the owner of  
the rights correctly identifies the infringing content because, otherwise, they would be 
subject to this obligation of  control. Therefore, in principle, it is the interested party 
who must duly identify the infringing content (e.g. by providing a specific URL) and 
explain why it should be removed (e.g. trademark infringement). Until such notification 
the intermediary enjoys a disclaimer which will only be deactivated if  he does not 
withdraw the content diligently.
It follows from Articles 12 to 15 of  the EC Directive that “Where an information 
society service is provided that consists of  the transmission in a communication network of  information 
provided by a recipient of  the service, or the provision of  access to a communication network, Member 
States shall ensure that the service provider is not liable for the information transmitted” [Article 
12(1)],23 nor in data storage services, whether temporary or not, provided that it did 
not intervene in any conscious way in the selection or editing of  the content. It then 
states by way of  guarantee that: “the provider does not have actual knowledge of  illegal activity or 
information and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware of  facts or circumstances from which the 
illegal activity or information is apparent” [Article 14(1)(a)] or “the provider, upon obtaining such 
knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information” [Article 
14(1)(b)].
These provisions have been interpreted in light of  Recital 3024 of  Directive 
2009/136/EC25 amending Directive 2002/22/EC.26 According to this interpretation 
providers are not required to monitor information transmitted over their networks or 
to bring legal proceedings against their customers on grounds of  such information, nor 
does it make providers liable for that information. Responsibility for punitive action 
or criminal prosecution is a matter for national law, respecting fundamental rights and 
freedoms, including the right to due process”.27 Along these lines, the judgments of  
the European Court of  Justice of  16 February 2012 (SABAM vs Netlog),28 8 September 
23 On the condition that the provider: (a) does not initiate the transmission; (b) does not select the 
receiver of  the transmission; and (c) does not select or modify the information contained in the 
transmission.
24 Recital 30 Directive 2009/136/EC “Directive 2002/22/EC (Universal Service Directive) does not require 
providers to monitor information transmitted over their networks or to bring legal proceedings against their customers on 
grounds of  such information, nor does it make providers liable for that information. Responsibility for punitive action 
or criminal prosecution is a matter for national law, respecting fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to 
due process.”
25 Directive 2009/136/EC of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  25 November 
2009 amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic 
communications networks and services, Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of  
personal data and the protection of  privacy in the electronic communications sector and Regulation 
(EC) No 2006/2004 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of  
consumer protection laws (OJEU 25.11.2009).
26 Directive 2002/22/EC of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  7 March 2002 on 
universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services 
(Universal Service Directive) (OJEU 24.04.2002).
27 Recital 30 2009/136/EC Directive.
28 Judgment SABAM vs Netlog (Case C-360/10, 16.2.2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:85) stresses the importance 
of  preventive monitoring: “[p]reventive monitoring of  this kind would thus require active observation of  files stored 
by users with the hosting service provider and would involve almost all of  the information thus stored and all of  the service 
users of  that provider”, concluding in paragraph 39 of  the judgment that “In the light of  the foregoing, it must 
be held that the injunction imposed on the hosting service provider requiring it to install the contested filtering system would 
oblige it to actively monitor almost all the data relating to all of  its service users in order to prevent any future infringement 
of  intellectual-property rights. It follows that that injunction would require the hosting service provider to carry out general 
monitoring, something which is prohibited by Article 15(1) of  Directive 2000/31”.
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2016 (GSMedia BV),29 14 June 2017 (Stichting Brein Jack v Frederik Wullems)30 and 7 
August 2018 (SNB-REACT),31 among others, consider that imposing an obligation 
on an Information Society service provider to actively monitor all of  its content 
(in this case, simply because of  the risk of  being punished if  something infringes 
copyright) is completely disproportionate, both in terms of  the technological 
investment involved and the risk of  damaging the fundamental rights of  the users of  
online content service provider.32
Such a generous regime of  exemption from liability, and, in the case of  
Spanish legislation, such a restrictive interpretation of  the basic concept of  “effective 
knowledge”, has practically consecrated a regime of  impunity for information society 
intermediaries for the illegal activities or information of  the users of  their service, 
with the consequent disorder and - in some cases - defenselessness for the holders of  
rights that are flagrantly and massively violated through these aggregation services.33
For all these reasons, in the context described above, the sectoral reform 
represented by Article 17 Copyright in the DSM Directive was welcomed by the 
groups that defend greater protection of  rightholders, as in fact the EC Directive 
standard (sufficiently reactive) may not be valid for certain services.34 However, as 
will be seen below, the changes were not as radical as initially stated in the text of  
Article 13 DSM Proposal for a Directive.
4. Analysis of  Article 17 Copyright in the DSM Directive 
4.1. Introduction
The unclear wording present in all ten paragraphs of  Article 17 of  the Copyright 
in the DSM Directive requires, by way of  introduction, a summary of  its general 
characteristics and a clarification of  the legislative mechanisms used to design a new 
liability model for digital content exchange platforms.
Briefly, Article 17 of  the Copyright in the DSM Directive establishes a specific 
exemption regime, applicable to service providers for sharing content online, as 
opposed to the general regime in Article 14 of  the EC Directive. It establishes a 
specific liability regime for what it calls ‘online content sharing service providers’. It 
emphasizes collaboration between rightholders and service providers, as well as in the 
search for the right balance between the fundamental rights at stake (e.g, paragraph 
10). Thus, the need to respect the lawful uses of  protected works and services, in 
particular those protected by exceptions and limitations, is stressed (paragraphs. 7, 9 
and 10). Similarly, it seeks to protect users’ personal data (paragraph 9), and prohibits 
the establishment of  general monitoring obligations (paragraph 8).
29 C-160/15, ECLI:EU:C:2016:644.
30 C-610/15, ECLI:EU:C:2017:456.
31 C-521/17, ECLI:EU:C: 2018:639.
32 Margarita Orozco González, “El «value gap» y los mecanismos de detección de contenidos en 
materia de Propiedad Intelectual. Apuntes sobre la controvertida Propuesta de Directiva 2016”, La 
Ley 12986 (2018):7-9.
33 Carbajo Cascón, “Delimitación”, 235-236.
34 The EC Directive provides for such an approach as a general rule and therefore many authors 
consider that it would have been more appropriate to amend it rather than introduce a new liability 
mechanism in a sectorial copyright directive. Eduardo Serrano Gómez, “Los prestadores de servicios 
para compartir en línea contenidos cargados por los usuarios”, in Medios de comunicación, contenidos 
digitales y derecho de autor (Madrid: Reus, 2019), 64.
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Thus, at a first level, it stipulates that providers of  online content exchange 
services perform an act of  communication to the public when their users make 
available protected works or content and that they must therefore reach agreements 
with the rightholders to avoid being liable for an infringement of  copyright or related 
rights, recognizes that providers of  these services may be exempted from liability if  
they prove that they acted diligently in reaching an agreement with rightholders and 
in trying to prevent the protected works or other subject-matter previously identified 
by rightholders from being accessible through their services. 
4.2. Concept of online content sharing service provider 
The liability and obligations set out in Article 17 only apply to the platform 
whose main activity is to provide access to a large amount of  copyright-protected 
content, and it does so for commercial purposes. It is therefore a type of  the more 
general category of  hosting service providers referred to in Article 14 EC Directive35
Under the terms of  Article 2(6) of  the Directive, in its first paragraph: “online 
content-sharing service provider” means a provider of  an information society service of  
which the main or one of  the main purposes is to store and give the public access 
to a large amount of  copyright-protected works or other protected subject matter 
uploaded by its users, which it organizes and promotes for profit-making purposes.
Thus, Recital 62 explains that “The definition of  an online content-sharing service 
provider laid down in this Directive should target only online services that play an important role on 
the online content market by competing with other online content services, such as online audio and 
video streaming services, for the same audiences. The services covered by this Directive are services, 
the main or one of  the main purposes of  which is to store and enable users to upload and share a 
large amount of  copyright-protected content with the purpose of  obtaining profit therefrom, either 
directly or indirectly, by organising it and promoting it in order to attract a larger audience, including 
by categorising it and using targeted promotion within it. Such services should not include services 
that have a main purpose other than that of  enabling users to upload and share a large amount of  
copyright-protected content with the purpose of  obtaining profit from that activity”. 36
Analysis of  whether an online content sharing service provider stores and 
provides access to a large amount of  copyright-protected content should be done 
on a case-by-case basis and take into account a combination of  elements, such as 
the audience for the service and the number of  copyright-protected content files 
uploaded by users of  the services.
To complete the description of  the active provider, the European legislator 
established a presumption in Article 17(5). Thus, in order to determine whether the 
service provider has fulfilled his obligations under paragraph 4, and in the light of  
the principle of  proportionality, the following factors, inter alia, must be taken into 
account: (a) the type, the audience and size of  the service and the type of  works or 
other subject-matter uploaded by the users of  the service; and (b) the availability of  
suitable and effective means and their cost for service providers.
In order to ensure that there is no doubt about the importance of  curbing mass 
economic exploitation offences, Article 2(6) makes it clear that they are excluded 
35 Pedro A. De Miguel Asensio, “Mercado Único Digital y Propiedad Intelectual: las Directivas 
2019/789 y 2019/790”, La Ley Unión Europea 71(2019): 4.
36 The final version of  the Directive refers to “providers of  online content sharing services”. The change 
in terminology that Serrano attributes to the desire for less “aggressive” language towards service 
providers is of  no great significance (Serrano Gómez, “Los prestadores”, 71).
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“[p]roviders of  services, such as not-for-profit online encyclopedias, not-for-profit educational and 
scientific repositories, open source software-developing and-sharing platforms, providers of  electronic 
communications services as defined in Directive (EU) 2018/1972, online marketplaces, business-
to-business cloud services and cloud services that allow users to upload content for their own use, are 
not ‘online content-sharing service providers’ within the meaning of  this Directive”.
4.3. Concept and scope of communication to the public
The new liability regime for online content providers laid down in the Directive 
does not affect the concept of  communication to the public or of  making available 
to the public elsewhere under Union law, nor does it affect the possible application 
of  Article 3(1) and (2) of  Directive 2001/29/EC to other service providers using 
copyright-protected content.37
4.4. Liability for copyright infringements: a new safe harbour
Consequently, pursuant to Article 17 of  the Copyright in the DSM Directive, 
providers of  online content sharing services perform an act of  communication to the 
public or of  making available to the public for the purposes of  the Directive when 
they offer the public access to works or other copyrighted material uploaded by their 
users. Therefore, they are not mere hosts, but carry out acts of  communication to 
the public.
Because of  that condition, providers of  online content sharing services must 
therefore obtain authorisation from the rightholders referred to in Article 3(1) and 
(2) of  Directive 2001/29/EC, for example by concluding a licensing agreement, in 
order to communicate to the public or make available to the public works or other 
protected material.
In this case, the limitation of  liability in Article 14 EC Directive shall not apply 
to providers of  content sharing services.
For users and consumers of  protected content it is of  particular interest Article 
17(2), as it requires Member States to provide that where a provider of  online content 
sharing services obtains an authorisation, for example by concluding a licensing 
agreement, that authorisation shall also cover acts carried out by users of  services 
falling within the scope of  Article 3 of  Directive 2001/29/EC if  they are not acting 
commercially or if  their activity does not generate significant revenues.
However, if  no authorisation is granted, providers of  online content sharing 
services shall be liable for unauthorised acts of  communication to the public, including 
making available to the public copyright works and other protected material, unless 
the service providers can demonstrate that the following criteria are met.38
(a) Made best efforts to obtain an authorization.
If  authorisation is granted, the act of  communication to the public by the 
service provider will fall within the scope of  the authorisation granted by the 
rightholder. This is clear from Recital 69:“[w]here online content-sharing service providers 
obtain authorisations, including through licensing agreements, for the use on their service of  content 
37 Recital 64 of  Copyright in the DSM Directive makes it clear.
38 The Copyright in the DSM Directive recognises the appropriateness of  some kind of  limitation 
of  the service providers’ liability, since, after all, the content is not loaded by the provider but by 
its users (see Recital 66); however, the conditions of  the safe harbour are very different from those 
contained in the EC Directive, in particular as regards monitoring obligations.
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uploaded by the users of  the service, those authorisations should also cover the copyright relevant 
acts in respect of  uploads by users within the scope of  the authorisation granted to the service 
providers, but only in cases where those users act for non-commercial purposes, such as sharing their 
content without any profit-making purpose, or where the revenue generated by their uploads is not 
significant in relation to the copyright relevant acts of  the users covered by such authorisations. Where 
rightholders have explicitly authorised users to upload and make available works or other subject 
matter on an online content-sharing service, the act of  communication to the public of  the service 
provider is authorised within the scope of  the authorisation granted by the rightholder. However, 
there should be no presumption in favour of  online content-sharing service providers that their users 
have cleared all relevant rights”.
Article 17 of  the Copyright in the DSM Directive and its corresponding 
recitals correct the content of  Article 13 of  the Copyright in the DSM Proposal for 
a Directive and omit any references to technical measures and instead requires “best 
efforts”.39 As López Richart points out, the Directive has corrected this imbalance 
in the negotiating power of  the parties, since it no longer requires the conclusion 
of  licence contracts, but only the “utmost effort” to reach an agreement with the 
rightholders.40
While it is true that there is no general obligation of  monitoring, taking into 
account that for the exemption from its liability the online content provider must 
act in accordance with the terms of  Article 17(2) (b) (best efforts), it is reasonable 
to think that although it does not directly require the use of  monitoring or filtering 
technologies, article 17 can reasonably be interpreted as inviting to achieve this result.
For this, in the words of  López Richart, the new Liability Exemption Scheme, 
which is a derogation from the more generous scheme provided for in the EC 
Directive, may end up being of  enormous practical importance, since far from 
encouraging agreements between rightsholders and service providers for the use of  
protected works and content - which is the purpose of  the rule. – it seems to call for 
the consolidation of  the use of  automated content recognition mechanisms - which 
had already been used by some platforms on a voluntary basis – as mechanisms for 
the preventive protection of  copyright and related rights.41
(b) Made, in accordance with high industry standards of  professional diligence, best efforts to 
ensure the unavailability of  specific works and other subject matter for which the rightholders have 
provided the service providers with the relevant and necessary information 
Unlike Article 13 of  the Copyright in the DSM Proposal for a Directive, it does 
not make express reference to the use of  effective content recognition technologies, 
but the provision is certainly primarily concerned with them. There are currently 
a number of  automated digital content recognition techniques used for different 
purposes.
And in any event, (c) Acted expeditiously, upon receiving a sufficiently substantiated notice 
from the rightholders, to disable access to, or to remove from their websites, the notified works or other 
subject matter, and made best efforts to prevent their future uploads in accordance with point (b).
That is, in order to benefit from the exemption from liability, the service 
provider is required to act with diligence.
39 Bridy, “The Price of  closing the value gap”, 131.
40 López Richart, “Responsables, ma non troppo”, 337.
41 López Richart, “Responsables, ma non troppo”, 308-309.
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Nevertheless, the Directive presents a number of  limits and exceptions to 
liability. The same Article 17(3) clarifies that this does not, however, affect the possible 
application to service providers of  the exclusion of  liability in Article 14(1) of  the 
EC Directive to those service providers for purposes falling outside the scope of  this 
Directive.
The objections expressed by different groups against Article 17 (previously 
Article 13) were, on the one hand, the restriction of  freedom of  expression and, also, 
the discouragement of  innovation by small and medium-sized platforms.
As far as freedom of  expression is concerned, although in my view the answer 
would be the same even without this explicit mention, Article 17(7) of  the Copyright 
in the DSM Directive clarifies that cooperation between providers of  online content 
sharing services and rightholders does not result in unavailability of  protected works 
or other subject-matter uploaded by users which do not infringe copyright and related 
rights, in particular where such protected works or other subject-matter are covered by 
an exception or limitation. 
Member States shall ensure that users in each Member State may invoke any of  
the following existing exceptions or limitations when uploading and making available 
user-generated content on online content sharing services:
a) quotation, criticism, review;
b) use for the purpose of  caricature, parody or pastiche.
Also with regard to the extent of  the liability contained in the provision it is clear 
that its application does not imply any general monitoring obligation [Article 17(8)]. 
Member States shall provide that providers of  online content sharing services 
make available to rightholders, on request, adequate information on the functioning 
of  their practices with regard to the cooperation referred to in paragraph 4 and, where 
licensing agreements are concluded between service providers and right holders, 
information on the use of  the content covered by the agreements.
In any event, Member States shall provide that providers of  online content sharing 
services establish an effective and rapid complaint and redress mechanism available to 
users of  their services in the event of  disputes concerning the blocking of  access to, or 
removal of, works or other protected subject-matter uploaded by them.
When rightholders request that access to their specific works or other protected 
subject-matter be blocked or that those works or subject-matter be removed, they shall 
duly substantiate their requests. Complaints lodged under the mechanism provided for 
in the rule shall be processed without undue delay and decisions to block access to or 
remove downloaded content shall be subject to human control. 
It should be stressed that this point should be given particular attention when 
States transpose the Directive. This is because this more individualized solution does 
not necessarily exclude de facto mass monitoring, since Article 17(2)(b) (best efforts) 
leaves the door open to more generalized monitoring of  a preventive nature.
Member States shall also ensure that out-of-court dispute resolution mechanisms 
are available. Such mechanisms shall allow disputes to be settled impartially and shall 
not deprive the user of  the legal protection afforded by national law, without prejudice 
to users’ right to effective judicial remedies. In particular, Member States shall ensure 
that users have access to a court or other relevant judicial body to claim the use of  an 
exception or limitation with regard to rules on copyright and related rights.
This Directive shall in no way prejudice legitimate uses, such as uses covered by 
exceptions or limitations under Union law, nor lead to any identification of  individual 
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users or to the processing of  personal data, except in accordance with Directive 
2002/58/EC and Regulation (EU) 2016/679. 
Online content sharing service providers inform their users in their general 
conditions of  the possibility to use works and other material protected under exceptions 
or limitations to copyright and related rights under Union law. 
4.5 Copyright and innovation
Another concern in the design of  the Directive was to avoid the possibility of  
a new liability regime harming innovation in the sector of  small and medium-sized 
service platforms, particularly start-ups.
Member States should therefore provide that for new providers of  online content 
exchange services whose services have been made available to the public within the 
Union for less than three years and whose annual turnover is less than EUR 10 
million, calculated in accordance with Commission Recommendation 2003/361/
EC, the conditions of  the liability regime set out in paragraph 1.4 shall be limited 
to compliance with the provisions of  paragraph 4(a) and to acting diligently, upon 
receipt of  a sufficiently reasoned notice, to block access to the notified works or other 
protected subject-matter or to remove such works or other protected subject-matter 
from their Internet sites.  
Well, in order to avoid distortions, if  the average monthly number of  individual 
visitors to these service providers exceeds 5 million, calculated on the basis of  the 
previous calendar year, these providers must also demonstrate that they have made 
their best efforts to prevent other downloads of  the works and other protected material 
for which the holders have provided the relevant and necessary information.
5. Opportunities for transposition of  the Copyright in the DSM 
Directive: the Spanish case
In the case of  Spain, the transposition of  Article 17 Copyright in the DSM 
Directive will be an opportunity to reform the system of  civil protection of  the rights 
recognized in the Intellectual Property Law (hereinafter, “IPL”),42 which combines 
mechanisms of  both a preventive and a reactive nature. This Regulation has several 
technical shortcomings, highlighted by the doctrine, and reflected in contradictory case 
law.43
Carbajo Cascón draws our attention to the fact that the law in force in Spain 
contemplates essentially direct infractions of  the exclusive rights of  reproduction, 
distribution, public communication and transformation (Articles 18, 19, 20 and 21 
IPL); although it also typifies infringements of  intellectual property rights, in this case 
indirect ones, the circumvention of  technological protection measures (Article 161 
IPL) and information for the management of  rights (Article 162 IPL), while Article 
138 I and 139.1 a) IPL includes within the actions for cessation and compensation of  
illegal activities against intellectual property the acts or activities referred to in Articles 
160 and 162 of  the same legal text.44
42 Royal Legislative Decree 1/1996, of  12 th april, enacting the consolidated text of  the Intellectual 
Property Act.
43 Summarizes it Sara Martín Salamanca, “Derecho de autor”, in Derecho de la Propiedad Intelectual, ed. 
Miguel Ruiz Muñoz (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2017), 128.
44 Carbajo Cascón, “Delimitación”, 230.
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The process of  transposition of  the Copyright in the DSM Directive will 
therefore be an opportunity to improve the legislative technique of  this system 
of  protection of  the rights recognized in the IPL and, in particular, to extend and 
strengthen the measures to prevent copyright infringement.
Another aspect that would deserve special attention in a transposition process 
is the improvement of  the licensing system, in order to encourage the lawful mass 
use of  works. Article 17 Copyright in the DSM Directive does not impose a specific 
modality of  authorization, it only points out the possibility of  concluding a license 
contract (paragraph 2), therefore it could be appropriate that in the transposition 
the national legislator considers other formulas of  authorization such as collective 
licenses, whether voluntary, extended or compulsory, or legal licenses.
On the other hand, despite not imposing an obligation to monitor content, the 
requirement for special diligence (“best efforts”) may influence the consolidation of  
the use of  automatic content recognition mechanisms - which had already been used 
by some platforms on a voluntary basis - as tools for the preventive protection of  
copyright and related rights, so we must be attentive to a transposition that respects 
the rights of  consumers and the general public. 
